Prior research suggests that consumers are forgiving of a price increase that is commensurate with increased vendor costs. We argue that the perceived fairness of the price increase will also depend on the alignability of the cost and price increases, such that alignable increases will be perceived as more acceptable than nonalignable increases. Moreover, we predict that when a cost increase is nonalignable, consumers will be more receptive to a service price increase than a goods price increase. Evidence from a series of experiments supports both predictions. These qualifications also illustrate the tendency of prior research to focus on the nature of the cost at the expense of the locus of the price increase. The present research focuses on the intersection of these price variables by examining the importance of aligning the nature of the cost increase with the locus of the price increase. The distinction between products and services offers a compelling context for such an inquiry.
aggregate price for repeated rental of a good is deemed less fair than the aggregate price for repeated purchase of an equivalent service. Bolton et al. attributed this result to price comparisons that can be made against the invariant material cost in the case of goods. Services, on the other hand, have no salient CGS reference point against which prices can be compared and profits inferred. We use this result and its presumed cause to guide hypotheses regarding additional good-service differences in perceived price fairness.
ALIGNABILITY
Alignable Costs. Our first premise is that consumers will take into account the relationship between the nature of costs and the locus of price increase when judging price fairness. Price increases that are alignable with cost increases will be perceived as relatively fair.
This premise is particularly intuitive in contexts involving subsidization. For example, the markups on different components of a meal (e.g., salad, entrée, desert, wine) vary dramatically, and we suspect that vegetarians would deem it unfair to subsidize the restaurateur's low-margin meat entrées (Wall Street Journal 2000) . In the present context of the good-service distinction, alignable costs are operationalized as direct costs (i.e., labor for a service, material costs for a good). Thus, when vendors offer both goods and services, and the nature of the cost increase is salient to consumers, H1: Consumers will deem it fair to increase the price of a good (service) when costs associated with the good (service) increase. However, consumers will deem it unfair to increase the price of a good to compensate for increased costs of a service, and vice versa.
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Nonalignable Costs. Using H1 as a point of comparison, a key question concerns nonalignable costs. In the present research, nonalignable costs are legitimate costs incurred by the vendor which do not have a self-evident association with a specific vendor offering. A common example would be a general overhead cost, such as rent. For a vendor who offers both goods and services, an increase in rent cannot be tied specifically to either. DE predicts merely that the vendor is entitled to raise prices to cover the increased cost but is silent with regard to the locus of the price increase. If the good and service are separable, i.e., one can be purchased independently of the other, a reasonable null hypothesis is that the increased price should be spread equally across the good and service so that all purchasers will contribute to maintaining the vendor's reference profit (thereby avoiding subsidization). If the good and service are not separable, i.e., they are bundled by necessity and must be co-purchased, consumers should be indifferent to the locus of the price increase, inasmuch as the locus itself has no monetary implications and is merely a framing issue. In contrast, we argue that the locus of the price increase will have a significant influence on perceptions of price fairness.
Our rationale is based on the aforementioned difference in tangibility between products and services. Bolton et al. (2003) report that price differences across vendors of goods are deemed most fair when they can be attributed to differences in quality (i.e., CGS); other costs tend to be ignored or devalued. As a result, consumers will be sensitive to any increase in goods pricing that is not commensurate with an increase in CGS. Insofar as services lack such a salient reference point, H2: When salient vendor costs are nonalignable, consumers will deem it less fair to increase the price of goods than the price of services.
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This hypothesis is expected to hold in the case of a single vendor who offers both goods and services as well as in the case of independent vendors of goods and services who face cost increases of a similar nature. The relative perceived unfairness of an increase in the price of goods would represent a deviation from DE but would be consistent with our argument that consumers are sensitive to the the locus of the price increase for nonalignable vendor costs.
Alignable Costs in Retrospect. We have argued that perceived fairness is a relatively straightforward matter when costs and prices are alignable. Inasmuch as DE has focused on reactions to price increases, we have also intentionally limited our argument to alterations in the status quo. However, there is reason to believe that consumer response to retrospective costs, even when such costs are alignable, will also be affected by the same differences in tangibility that underlie our earlier predictions.
A robust finding in decision research is an inappropriate sensitivity to sunk costs such that individuals tend to escalate commitment to past investments, even when such "sunk costs" are irrelevant to the decision at hand (e.g., Arkes and Blumer 1985) . Less well appreciated from past research is the tendency for decision makers to depreciate sunk costs (Gourville and Soman 1998) . We suggest that such depreciation will differ systematically as a function of tangibility of the product offering. Our rationale is that the material costs of a tangible good endure whereas other non-material costs (such as labor inputs) are tied to the production process. Salient and invariant material costs cannot be dismissed by the consumer as readily as "sweat equity".
Formally, 8
H3: Consumers will depreciate a salient vendor cost and, moreover, this tendency will be especially strong for intangible vendor costs, leading to lower price fairness judgments.
H3 may be viewed as a boundary condition on the alignability premise. Even when costs and prices are alignable, differential depreciation of the vendor's costs as a function of the tangibility of those costs may lead to differences in perceived fairness.
Overview. We next present a series of studies that provide empirical tests of our hypotheses. Experiment 1 tests H1 and H2 in the context of separable offerings; experiments 2 and 3 provide a test of H2 in the absence of subsidization. To test H3, experiment 4 examines alignable costs in retrospect. In each case, our hypotheses are supported. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for consumer perceptions of price fairness.
EXPERIMENT 1
The initial scenario describes a vendor who incurs additional costs and passes those costs to customers in the form of increased prices. The vendor's offering contains both goods and services, and the price increase is assigned in equal fashion to either the goods or the service component. The cost increase is either alignable (associated with the goods or the service) or nonalignable (e.g., rent). DE suggests that the vendor is entitled to extra compensation in return for the newly incurred cost but makes no predictions regarding the locus of compensation. H1
argues that consumers will judge it fairer to increase the price of a good (service) when faced with a cost increase alignable with the good (service). More important, H2 argues that consumers will judge it fairer to increase the price of the service than the good when costs are not alignable.
Method
Participants were staff and students (recruited from two local universities and a hospital) who received financial payment for their participation. They were randomly assigned to one of three cells in a three-group (alignable goods vs. alignable service vs. nonalignable overhead) between-subjects design. A total of 70 participants completed the task, with cell sizes ranging from 22 to 24.
Participants read the following scenario (with the goods/service/nonalignable manipulation shown in square brackets):
The Art House is a specialty store that sells art supplies (e.g., easels, brushes, paints, clay, sculpting tools, etc.) and art services (e.g., framing, kiln work, art classes, gallery tours, etc.). In the past year, the cost to the store of [art supplies sold to customers/art services sold to customers/overhead costs such as rent] has risen 25%. To cover this increase in costs and maintain the same profit margin as before, the store owner decides to increase prices. S/he has two options: 1) increase prices for art supplies by 25% (e.g., a set of sable paintbrushes that used to cost $100 is now priced at $125)
2) increase prices for art services by 25% (e.g., a set of watercolor classes that used to cost $100 is now priced at $125) Participants were then asked "As a consumer, which pricing option do you think is more fair?" They provided a rating on a seven-point scale (with endpoints indicating "option 1 is more fair" and "option 2 is more fair"). Afterward, they provided reasons for their judgment. In this and all subsequent experiments, coding of fairness rationales was conducted by two independent judges who were blind to the research hypotheses. Inter-coder reliability ranged from 82% to 87% and disagreements were resolved by a third judge. Because self-stated rationales should be interpreted cautiously, we offer them only as ancillary support for our hypotheses.
Results and Discussion
Consistent with hypotheses H1 and H2, planned comparisons showed that ratings differed The results from the Service and Goods conditions are consistent with H1, and reasonably so. If a cost can be tied to a particular offering by the vendor, consumers who purchase that offering should bear the brunt of the cost increase. The results from the Nonalignable condition are consistent with H2; that is, when vendor costs are nonalignable, an increase in service prices is perceived as fairer than an increase in goods prices.
Participants' rationales were consistent with their numerical responses. Omitting null responses, categorical analysis revealed a main effect of the locus of the cost increase (χ 2 (2) = 7.15, p < .05), such that participants faced with an increase in goods or services costs cited an alignment rationale (50% and 32%, respectively) more often than did participants faced with an increase in nonalignable costs (5%; χ 2 (1) = 5.69, p < .05). As expected, the difference between the Goods and Service conditions was not significant (χ 2 (1) = 1.42, p > .20). Thus, the belief that price increases should be aligned with cost increases was evident when costs were separable and alignable with either goods or services. The near absence of alignment-related rationales in the Nonalignable condition suggests that something other than alignability accounts for the preference among participants in this condition to raise service prices.
Robustness.
Although the results are consistent with predictions and internally consistent across quantitative and qualitative measures, we attempted to increase confidence in our conclusions by removing some ambiguity in our method and by generalizing to a larger universe of cost categories. With regard to ambiguity, we had instantiated the nonalignable cost as "overhead such as rent." Post-fairness rationales suggested otherwise, but the lack of specificity nonetheless may have prompted respondents to generate additional examples of overhead that were more alignable with services than goods. Thus, we reran the experiment but with the nonalignable cost increase assigned exclusively and specifically to rent; that is, we explicitly stated that "In the past year, costs for rent have risen dramatically." The increased price was set at 20%, but otherwise the scenario was unchanged.
While replicating this portion of the original design, we took the opportunity to tap reactions to other cost increases. After responding to the rent version of the scenario, all participants were instructed as follows:
Consider the following specific costs that have risen for a seller such as the Art House.
For each cost, please indicate whether you think it is fairer to pass on this cost by: (1) increasing the prices for goods sold by the seller (option 1), or (2) increasing the prices for services sold by the seller (option 2). As before, assume that the price increase will cover the costs and maintain the same profit margin.
Participants then provided ratings (using the same seven-point scale as before) for each of the following costs: "rent", "administrative costs", "insurance", "miscellaneous overhead, including utilities and computing", "taxes on revenue", "the cost to the store of goods", and "the cost to the store of providing services".
Consistent with H1, we expected that participants would judge it fairer to pass along higher goods (services) costs through higher goods (services) prices. Consistent with H2, we expected that participants would judge it fairer to pass on nonalignable costs (e.g., rent, administrative costs, insurance, utilities and computing overhead) through higher services prices.
We also hypothesized that participants would be indifferent to the locus of a price increase needed to cover taxes on revenue, inasmuch as consumers are accustomed to paying taxes on both goods and services.
Results from 19 participants were consistent with all predictions. First, we note that the rent rating (4.89) is remarkably similar to the "overhead such as rent" rating (4.75) in the main experiment. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that participants' inclination to compensate for a rent increase with higher prices on services than on goods was not due to ambiguity in the way overhead rent was expressed in the main study. Second, the replication across other cost categories demonstrates that the finding for rent is generalizable across other nonalignable costs.
Specifically, ratings did not differ across the various overhead costs pertaining to rent, 
Method
Participants were undergraduate students who received extra credit in an introductory marketing class. They were randomly assigned to one of two between-subjects conditions (i.e., goods vs. service). A total of 64 participants completed the task (32 per cell).
Participants read a scenario in which a price increase was applied either to a good or a service (as illustrated respectively within the square brackets):
Due to popular demand, the owner of a pharmacy decides to open on Sunday. As a result, overhead costs increase by 20%. [The pharmacy belongs to a pharmacy network; in this network, the prices of pharmacy services (for example, the dispensing fee paid to the pharmacist for filling a prescription) are regulated and cannot be increased at will. To cover the increase in costs, the pharmacy owner must therefore increase prices of prescription drugs on Sunday (such as the price for antibiotics). / The pharmacy belongs to a pharmacy network; in this network, the prices of prescription drugs (for example, a 2-week dose of antibiotics) are regulated and cannot be increased at will. To cover the increase in costs, the pharmacy owner must therefore increase prices for pharmacy services on Sunday (such as the dispensing fee paid to the pharmacist for filling a prescription Participants were then asked "As a consumer, how fair do you think the pharmacy owner's new pricing policy is?" and provided ratings on a seven-point scale (with endpoints indicating "very unfair" and "very fair"). Post-rating rationales were taken.
Results and Discussion
Consistent with H2, we hypothesized that increasing the price of a good would be perceived as less fair than increasing the price of a service in the face of increasing nonalignable costs. As expected, analysis showed that participants judged an increase in the service price (i.e., the dispensing fee) to be fairer than an increase in the goods price (i.e., antibiotics) (M service = 4.91 (1.99) vs. M goods = 3.56 (2.20); F(1, 62) = 6.57, p < .05).
Turning to the fairness rationales, we also anticipated that participants in the Service condition would be more likely to justify their responses in a manner consistent with DE (i.e., on the basis of the vendor's costs and the corresponding consumer benefit). Omitting irrelevant and null responses, 74% of participants in the Service condition cited costs or benefits compared to 52% in the Goods condition (χ 2 (1) = 2.79, p < .10). It is notable that the remaining participants in the Goods condition cited the increase in price over the everyday price (48%, vs. 26% in the service condition), consistent with a higher sensitivity to price increases arising from nonalignable costs for goods. As expected, the shift in fairness ratings was consistent with the shift in rationales, such that fairness ratings were substantially lower when everyday prices were cited than not (M = 2.30 vs. M = 5.19, respectively; F(1,61) = 37.96, p < .01).
To summarize, participants judged it less fair to raise goods prices than services prices to compensate for increased nonalignable costs even though (a) the cost was incurred while providing consumers with the additional and desired benefit of increased convenience, and (b) the vendor had no latitude regarding how prices were to be raised to cover costs. However, a potential obstacle to our interpretation is the possibility that participants instantiated the nonalignable cost (Sunday overhead) primarily in terms of labor costs, thereby rendering the experiment a stronger test of H1 than H2. Although no evidence for alignability could be detected in the post-rating rationales, we sought more probative evidence.
EXPERIMENT 3
In the present experiment the nonalignable cost was instantiated as rent. Both a betweensubjects and within-subject design were used. The between-subjects design again placed the locus of the price increase beyond the vendor's control; the within-subject design provided a conservative test by making the equivalence of the pricing options especially transparent.
Method
Participants were 50 undergraduate students who received extra credit in an introductory marketing class. Of these, 26 were randomly assigned to one of two between-subjects conditions (i.e., goods vs. service); the remaining 24 participants were assigned to the within-subject version of the study.
As before, participants read a scenario in which a price increase was applied either to a good or a service (as illustrated respectively within the square brackets).
"The owner of a pharmacy faces an increase in rent costs of 20%. [The pharmacy belongs to a pharmacy network; in this network, the prices of pharmacy services (for example, the dispensing fee paid to the pharmacist for filling a prescription) are regulated
and cannot be increased at will. To cover the increase in costs and make the same profit margin, the pharmacy owner must therefore increase prices of prescription drugs (for example, the price of a 2-week dose of antibiotics). / The pharmacy belongs to a pharmacy network; in this network, the prices of prescription drugs (for example, a 2-week dose of antibiotics) are regulated and cannot be increased at will. To cover the increase in costs and make the same profit margin, the pharmacy owner must therefore increase prices for pharmacy services (for example, the dispensing fee paid to the pharmacist for filling a prescription Participants were then asked: "As a consumer, how fair do you think the pharmacy owner's new pricing policy is?" and provided fairness ratings on a seven-point scale (with endpoints "very unfair" and "very fair".
Participants in the within-subject version read a similar scenario and were presented with the pricing options adjacent to each other (i.e., participants could increase either the service or goods price to cover the increase in rent costs). Participants were then asked "As a consumer, which pricing option do you think is more fair?" Ratings were provided on a seven-point scale (with endpoints "Option 1" and "Option 2").
Results and Discussion
All results were consistent with H2. The between-subjects test revealed that participants judged an increase in the service price (i.e., the dispensing fee) to be fairer than an increase in the goods price (i.e., antibiotics) (M service = 4.77 (1.92) vs. M goods = 3.46 (1.71); one-tailed t(24) = 1.83, p = .04). Similarly, the within-subject test indicated that, relative to indifference, participants judged it more fair to increase the service price than the goods price (M = 5.12
(1.90), one-tailed t(23) = 2.99, p < .01). Indeed, 65.4% of participants judged it fairer to increase the service price, whereas only 19.2% of participants judged it fairer to increase the goods price and 15.4% were indifferent. Thus, even when the equivalence of the pricing options was made transparent and subsidization was beyond consideration, participants still judged it fairer to pass on nonalignable costs via services pricing.
EXPERIMENT 4
It appears that a vendor's flexibility to increase prices when cost increases are nonalignable is more constrained in the case of tangible product offerings. However, the more ephemeral nature of services does not imply that service vendors enjoy uniformly greater freedom to set prices and extract profits from the value they provide. Indeed, as reflected in H3, we argue that intangibility carries with it a greater vulnerability to depreciation, which may reduce the service provider's ability to extract profit commensurate with the utility offered to the consumer.
The present study employs a scenario in which both the product and service components of the seller's offering provide utility and, rationally speaking, should be valued by the consumer. We expect that consumers' fundamental sense of fairness will be reflected in their responses to the price of goods (consistent with DE). The case of services is less clear because intangible costs may be more readily depreciated. We also predict that this effect will be moderated by one's perspective on the transaction. Insofar as service costs are depreciated, the effect should be greater among buyers than sellers for the simple reason that sellers are more sensitive to the "sweat equity" invested in an offering than are buyers.
Method
Participants were undergraduate students who received extra credit in an introductory marketing class. They were randomly assigned to one of four cells in a 2 (goods vs. service) x 2 (buyer vs. seller) between-subjects design. A total of 198 participants completed the task, with cell sizes ranging from 41 to 55.
In the Buyer conditions, participants read the following scenario for purchase of a good or service (illustrated respectively within the square brackets): 
Results and Discussion
We hypothesized that sellers would be relatively insensitive to the goods-service distinction whereas buyers would be less inclined to pay the service cost than the goods cost. As shown in table 1, the mean fair prices are consistent with predictions. Sellers were insensitive to the source of their cost; buyers' fair price estimates were lower for the service than the good.
ANOVA revealed main effects of the buyer/seller (F(1,188) = 9.17, p < .01), goods/service manipulations (F(1,188) = 4.70, p < .05) and, more important, an interactive effect (F(1,188) = 3.45, p = .06). As expected, buyers' fair price estimates were lower for the service than the good (F(1,97) = 8.24, p < .01) whereas sellers' fair price estimates did not differ (F < 1). Table 1 also reveals a high degree of response variance. To address this point, a categorical analysis of the fair price estimates was conducted. Fair price estimates were categorized as either less than the original price (i.e., amortization) or greater than/equal to the original price of $1500 (i.e., no amortization). Categorical analysis revealed a main effect of buyer/seller perspective (χ 2 (1) = 4.78, p < .05) and the predicted two-way interaction (χ 2 (1) = 4.89, p < .05). The interaction obtained from buyers' greater inclination to provide lower fair price estimates in the Service condition. Simple effects tests indicated that buyers' fair price estimates were less than the original price for the service versus good (χ 2 (1) = 5.67, p < .05) 22 whereas sellers' fair price estimates did not differ (χ
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(1) = 0.47, p = .49). Unlike sellers, buyers deemed it less fair to pass on service costs than goods costs. We attribute these results to the higher tangibility of goods. Unlike the service, the good persists, thereby reducing buyer neglect of tangible cost inputs to pricing. (Although the present scenario controlled for utility of the product offering, a tangible good may also serve as a reminder of the offered utility.) We do not argue, however, that buyers will never consider intangible costs arising from services. Rather, we hypothesize that some service costs are easier to dismiss than others. In particular, a seller's intangible effort costs should be easier to dismiss than a seller's out-of-pocket monetary costs. In a follow-up experiment (available from the authors), we found that that buyers are less inclined to discount the seller's service costs when those costs involve a monetary outlay that has not yet taken place (i.e., cannot be amortized). We attribute this finding to the lack of tangibility of services, which makes it easier to neglect such inputs to price judgment with the passage of time. These results are consistent with the effects of tangibility in preceding experiments and further illustrate the pricing dilemma faced by sellers who attempt to pass service costs to customers.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
To recapitulate, the results support our contention that price increases are deemed fairer when they are aligned with the cost increase, ceteris paribus (H1). When alignability is not achievable due to the nature of the cost increase, an increase in the price of goods is perceived as less fair than an increase in the price of services (H2). We attribute the former to basic tenets of fairness (such as DE) and the reluctance for one consumer to subsidize the purchases of another.
We attribute the latter to the salient material costs of a good. We further argue that even when costs are alignable, services are more subject to depreciation than are goods due to the ephemeral nature of labor cost (H3). This effect provides a boundary condition on alignability.
Price Fairness. Perceived price fairness has many antecedents and consequences (Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004) . The present findings add to our growing understanding of price fairness perceptions in four ways. First, we propose that a principle of alignability rules price fairness reactions-a principle that we believe is implicit in much past research on, and inspired by, dual entitlement. Second, we examine the more interesting case of nonalignability. There are many legitimate costs (e.g., rent, administration) that vendors wish to recoup that are not associated with a specific product or service. We find systematic differences in consumer fairness reactions as a function of whether costs are aligned with prices and, when nonalignable, whether cost increases are passed on via goods or services pricing. Third, we examine depreciation of 24 alignable costs. We again find systematic differences for goods and services pricing that indicate a boundary condition on the principle of alignability. Fourth, our evidence provides additional support for the important role played by costs in determining price fairness reactions. Previous research has tended to focus on the nature of the cost (e.g., controllable or uncontrollable, material or non-material) while neglecting its alignability with price. Firms naturally distinguish between direct and indirect costs for accounting purposes. Although the mapping of (non)alignable costs to (in)direct costs is imperfect, we show that such distinctions are important from the consumer perspective of price fairness. Moreover, we show that inherent differences between goods and services can exert a large influence on perceived fairness when costs are nonalignable.
Goods versus Services.
Although recent research has questioned the existence of a clear dichotomy between goods and services (Laroche, Bergeron, and Goutaland 2001) , it may also be argued that the distinction is gaining in consequence (Vargo and Lusch 2004) . Our results suggest that any attempt to minimize the distinction is accompanied by the risk of overlooking important differences in consumer price fairness perceptions. The present studies illustrate effects that may be driven by differences in tangibility that characterize goods and services.
Specifically, goods have salient material costs that serve as reference points for selling prices and price increases and that may distract consumers from other costs. Consequently, the price of goods may be "stickier" or less malleable than services pricing. However, it is important to note that these differences in malleability do not systematically favor one locus of price increase over the other. For example, fairness reactions favor higher service prices in experiments 1-3 but lower service prices in experiment 4 (relative to goods prices). These results are consistent with 25 research suggesting that pre-consumption quality expectations are more variable-and that postconsumption quality perceptions decline more-for intangible than tangible elements of a product offering (Bebko 2000; Palmer and O'Neill 2003) .
Inasmuch as fairness is a driver of customer satisfaction (cf. Campbell 1999; Homburg, Hoyer, and Koschate 2005; Sinha and Batra 1999) , our findings describe occasions on which consumers will be particularly dissatisfied with goods and services. As a result, the drivers of customer satisfaction and loyalty for goods and services may differ, with obvious implications for consumer welfare and customer relationship management. The findings also address price competition between goods and services. Because a salient reference point contributes to less malleable prices for tangible products, there will be instances in which sellers of services will have more latitude to charge prices that recoup nonalignable cost investments. However, an opposite outcome may obtain if the lack of material costs lead consumers to underestimate costs altogether. At the extreme, providers of a pure service may be viewed as having negligible costs, and therefore consumers may be especially unwilling to pay a price commensurate with the value provided by the vendor (see Nunes, Hsee, and Weber 2004) .
Limitations. We have operationalized tangibility and the corresponding notion of material costs in terms of goods and services. The obvious risk of such an approach, especially in a scenario-based paradigm, is that more than a single difference separates goods and services.
Although we strove for variation in our instantiation of goods and services across studies, further replication would bolster generalizability. Nonetheless, we note that the pattern of results observed in both our quantitative and qualitative measures is consistent with our motivating rationale.
It might also be argued that our particular scenarios artificially inflated consumers' knowledge and consideration of vendor costs. The salience of vendor costs is difficult to specify but likely varies across consumer contexts. We note, however, that our results do not rely upon accurate knowledge of vendor costs. In fact, prior research suggests that such knowledge can be low (Bolton et al. 2003) . Rather, our results merely require that products and services differ in cost structure and that consumers are unequally sensitive to those costs.
To conclude, it is becoming clear that consumer reactions to prices are driven by more than just the utility received from a purchase. Indeed, Thaler (1985) famously demonstrated that consumers resist endowing a vendor with a high profit even when the vendor's profit-laden price does not exceed the utility offered by the good. We develop this theme further by demonstrating how the nature of a cost increase and the locus of a price increase affect perceived fairness and, presumably, willingness to pay. 
